This　paper　analyzes　the　role　of　corporate　political　connections　in　firm　performance　from　31　European　countries　using　LexisNexis　(R),　a　database　that　provides　a　highly　standardized　indicator　of　political　links.　Our　results　suggest　that　the　political　connections　of　managers　and　board　members　gradually　gnaw　away　at　firm　performance,　especially　in　the　case　of　individuals　with　greater　decision-making　power,　i.e.　senior　executives　and　CEOs.　We　respond　to　the　need　for　objectivity　and　generalizability　of　results　regarding　this　topic　in　management　literature,　espe-cially　since　previous　research　has　mainly　focused　on　single　country　studies.　In　addition　we　also　provide　a　number　of　practical　implications.