Manuscript　Type:　Empirical　Research　Question/Issue:　This　study　investigates　the　moderating　role　of　CEO　overpayment　on　the　relationship　between　firm　performance　and　CEO　dismissal.　We　also　examine　how　contextual　factors,　including　compensation　disclosure　regulation,　firm　index　status,　and　firm　age,　influence　board　attention　and　attribution,　and　consequently　affect　the　sensitivity　of　CEO　dismissal　to　firm　performance.　Research　Findings/Insights:　Using　a　sample　of　Chinese　listed　firms　between　2002　and　2011,　we　find　that　overpaid　CEOs　are　associated　with　a　larger　likelihood　of　dismissal　in　case　of　poor　firm　performance　compared　to　their　underpaid　counterparts.　In　addition,　CEO　overpayment　has　a　larger　influence　on　the　turnover-performance　relationship　when　executive　compensation　disclosure　is　mandatory,　when　a　firm　is　index-included,　or　younger.　Theoretical/Academic　Implications:　This　study　provides　empirical　support　for　attribution　theory　and　the　attention-based　view.　Built　on　the　concept　of　bounded　rationality,　it　demonstrates　that　board　sense-making　and　causal　attributions　affect　the　CEO　dismissal　decision.　Our　study　also　sheds　light　on　the　influence　of　situational　cues　on　shaping　board　attention　and　subsequent　corporate　governance　decisions.　Practitioner/Policy　Implications:　This　study　offers　insights　to　policymakers　interested　in　enhancing　the　design　of　corporate　governance　mechanisms　by　paying　attention　to　cognitive　processes　in　the　boardroom.