This　paper　studies　China＇s　star　CEOs　defined　as　members　of　the　National　People＇s　Congress　(NPC)　or　the　National　Committee　of　the　Chinese　People＇s　Political　Consultative　Conference　(CPPCC)　and　politically　connected　CEOs　who　have　previous　government　or　military　experience.　We　evaluate　the　effect　of　star　CEOs　and　politically　connected　CEOs　on　firm　performance　and　CEO　compensation.　We　find　that　announcement　date　returns,　CEO　compensation　and　incentives　are　all　higher　in　firms　that　appoint　star　CEOs.　However,　the　mechanism　explaining　these　various　premiums　is　largely　political　connectedness　of　these　star　CEOs.　Our　study　finds　only　modest　evidence　that　star-CEO　status　directly　determines　firm　performance.　Our　analysis　strongly　suggests　that　compensation　and　performance　premiums　are　mostly　driven　by　CEO　political　connections,　as　opposed　to　CEO　talent/star　effects.