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In this paper, we study the effect of preferential assistance on cooperation in the donation game. Cooperators provide benefits to their neighbors at some costs. Defectors pay no cost and do not distribute any benefits. The total contribution of a cooperator is fixed and he/she distributes his/her contribution unevenly to his/her neighbors. Each individual is assigned a weight that is the power of its degree, where the exponent a is an adjustable parameter. The amount that cooperator i contributes to a neighbor j is proportional to j's weight. Interestingly, we find that there exists an optimal value of alpha (which is positive), leading to the highest cooperation level. This phenomenon indicates that, to enhance cooperation, individuals could give high-degree neighbors more help, but only to a certain extent.
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JOURNAL OF STATISTICAL MECHANICS-THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
ISSN: 1742-5468
Year: 2018
2 . 3 7 1
JCR@2018
2 . 2 0 0
JCR@2023
ESI Discipline: PHYSICS;
ESI HC Threshold:158
JCR Journal Grade:1
CAS Journal Grade:2
Cited Count:
WoS CC Cited Count: 11
SCOPUS Cited Count: 14
ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List: 0 Unfold All
WanFang Cited Count:
Chinese Cited Count:
30 Days PV: 0