At　SAC　2021,　Frixons　et　al.　proposed　quantum　boomerang　attacks　that　can　effectively　recover　the　keys　of　block　ciphers　in　the　quantum　setting.　Based　on　their　work,　we　further　consider　how　to　quantize　the　generic　boomerang　attacks　proposed　by　Biham　et　al.　at　FSE　2002,　so　as　to　obtain　more　generic　quantum　boomerang　attacks.　Similar　to　Frixons　et　al.’s　work,　we　only　consider　quantum　key　recovery　attacks　in　the　single-key　setting.　With　the　help　of　some　famous　quantum　algorithms,　this　paper　presents　two　methods　to　convert　the　attacks　of　Biham　et　al.　into　some　new　quantum　key　recovery　attacks.　In　order　to　proof　our　methods,　we　apply　our　new　ideas　to　attack　Serpent-256　and　ARIA-196.　To　sum　up,　for　Serpent-256,　we　give　valid　9-round　and　10-round　quantum　key　recovery　attacks　respectively.　The　quantum　time　complexity　of　9-round　and　10-round　of　Serpent-256　is　2　115.43　and　2　126.6　respectively.　Furthermore,　we　show　a　valid　quantum　key　attack　on　6-round　ARIA-196　which　has　a　time　complexity　of　2　89.8　with　negligible　memory.　The　time　complexity　of　the　above　quantum　attacks　are　better　than　the　corresponding　classical　attacks　and　quantum　generic　key　recovery　attack　via　Grover’s　algorithm.　©　2023,　The　Author(s),　under　exclusive　licence　to　Springer　Science+Business　Media,　LLC,　part　of　Springer　Nature.