Generalized　Feistel　networks　are　important　components　of　symmetric　ciphers,　and　detailed　security　evaluations　in　the　quantum　setting　remain　to　be　explored.　In　this　paper,　based　on　the　strong-weak　separability　of　certain　branch　output　function,　we　present　polynomial-time　quantum　distinguishers　for　4F-function　and　2F-function　structures　in　quantum　chosen-plaintext　attack　setting　for　the　first　time,　and　then　quantum　key-recovery　attacks　are　achieved　through　Grover-meet-Simon　algorithm,　respectively.　Under　the　condition　of　the　semi-strong　separability,　firstly,　we　give　a　quantum　distinguisher　on　8-round　4F-function　structure,　from　which　we　carry　out　a　12-round　quantum　key-recovery　attack　to　guess　10n-bit　subkey,　whose　time　complexities　gain　a　factor　of　2(5n).　When　attacking　r　＞12　rounds,　we　can　recover　4(r-12)n+10n-bit　subkey　in　time　24(r-12)n+10m/2.　Secondly,　we　show　a　quantum　distinguisher　on　5-round　2F-function　structure,　and　a　7-round　quantum　key-recovery　attack　is　performed　on　it,　which　can　recover　3n-bit　subkey　in　time　2(1.5n).　When　r＞7,　2(r-7)n+3n-bit　subkey　can　be　recovered　with　time　complexities　by　a　factor　of　22(r-7)n+3n/2.　Furthermore,　based　on　the　weak　separability,　a　6-round　quantum　distinguisher　for　2F-function　structure　is　constructed,　and　an　8-round　quantum　key-recovery　attack　is　achieved,　and　the　time　complexity　is　22(r-8)n+3n/2　when　r＞8.　The　results　show　that　the　time　complexity　of　each　attack　scheme　we　proposed　is　much　better　than　that　of　Grover＇s　brute　force　search.