This　study　considers　the　choices　of　channel　structures　and　information　strategies　in　a　supply　chain　with　demand　uncertainty.　The　results　show　the　following:　(1)The　decentralized　channel　structure　dominates　the　centralized　channel　structure　when　the　information　strategy　is　given.　(2)Information　sharing　by　the　downstream　rival　is　always　beneficial　to　the　vertically　integrated　producer　but　is　not　necessarily　detrimental　to　itself.　In　particular,　information　sharing　increases　the　downstream　rival＇s　profit　in　the　centralized　channel　structure　when　the　demand　signal　is　relatively　accurate.　(3)The　vertically　integrated　producer　always　benefits　from　the　increase　in　forecast　accuracy　and　the　downstream　rival　may　be　worse　off　in　some　situations,　which　provides　a　theoretical　ground　for　the　“accuracy　trap.”　In　addition,　the　discussions　of　the　wholesale　price　commitment　and　the　uniform　pricing　contracts　show　that　the　wholesale　price　contracts　can　influence　the　information　sharing　conditions　of　the　downstream　rival　and　the　effects　of　strategic　decentralization,　eventually　influencing　the　equilibrium　strategies　of　channel　members.　©　2022　China　Science　Publishing　&　Media　Ltd.