Drawing　from　signaling　theory　in　information　economics,　this　study　investigates　the　mechanism　of　the　government　research　and　development　(R&D)　subsidies　grants　by　emphasizing　the　role　of　the　top　management　team　(TMT)　characteristics　in　the　context　of　China.　Specifically,　we　argue　that　TMT　characteristics　can　serve　as　valid　signals　by　conveying　legitimacy　to　reduce　information　asymmetry　between　firms　and　governments,　which　subsequently　affect　governments＇　decisions　to　grant　R&D　subsidies.　We　test　the　hypotheses　using　data　from　Chinese　listed　firms　between　2008　and　2019.　The　findings　indicate　that　age,　tenure,　diversity　in　functional　backgrounds,　or　team　size　of　enterprises＇　top　managers　are　positively　associated　with　the　amount　of　government　R&D　subsidies　granted.　This　positive　effect　is　more　pronounced　in　regions　with　a　lower　marketization　level.　This　study　contributes　to　the　existing　literature　on　R&D　subsidies,　and　offers　insights　to　both　policymakers　and　firm　managers.