We　introduce　a　deterministic　win-stay-lose-shift　rule　into　the　spatial　public　goods　game,　according　to　which　a　player　will　change　its　current　strategy　only　if　its　payoff　is　below　a　predefined　aspiration　level.　Simulation　results　on　the　square　lattice　and　scale-free　network　indicate　that　the　aspiration　level　greatly　affects　the　evolution　of　cooperation.　For　small　multiplication　factors,　the　frequency　of　cooperation　increases　to　0.5　as　the　aspiration　level　increases.　For　large　multiplication　factors,　intermediate　levels　of　aspiration　prove　optimal　for　the　successful　evolution　of　public　cooperation.　Some　qualitative　analyses　are　provided　to　explain　the　above　results.　Besides,　we　have　found　that　there　exists　a　ping-pong　vibration　of　cooperation　at　some　specific　values　of　multiplication　factors　and　aspiration　levels.　©　2012　Elsevier　B.V.　All　rights　reserved.