Indexed by：
Abstract：
In this paper, we propose a new kind of players as a compromise between the null player and the A-null player. It turns out that the axiom requiring this kind of players to get zero-payoff together with the well-known axioms of efficiency, additivity, coalitional symmetry, and intra-coalitional symmetry characterize the Shapley–solidarity value. This way, the difference between the Shapely–solidarity value and the Owen value is pinpointed to just one axiom. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.
Keyword：
Reprint 's Address：
Email：
Source ：
Operations Research Letters
ISSN： 0167-6377
Year： 2018
Issue： 2
Volume： 46
Page： 163-167
0 . 7 6 1
JCR@2018
0 . 8 0 0
JCR@2023
ESI HC Threshold：170
JCR Journal Grade：4
CAS Journal Grade：4
Cited Count：
SCOPUS Cited Count： 16
ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List： 0 Unfold All
WanFang Cited Count：
Chinese Cited Count：
30 Days PV： 0
Affiliated Colleges：
