The　manufacturer　rebate　strategy　is　considered　in　a　two-echelon　supply　chain　with　a　dominant　retailer　and　information　asymmetry.　The　equilibrium　solutions　are　given,　and　the　impacts　of　manufacturer　rebate　are　studied　by　sensitivity　analysis　and　numerical　analysis.　The　results　show　that,　1)　the　profits　of　channel　members　are　closely　related　to　the　proportion　of　rebate-sensitive　consumers,　redemption　rate　and　rebate　sensitivity　factor;　2)　Manufacturer　rebate　is　always　good　for　the　supply　chain　channel,　but　not　necessarily　for　manufacturer　and　retailer.　This　article　also　discusses　the　effects　of　retailer＇s　information　sharing　and　manufacturer＇s　ability　of　information　forecasting　on　the　performances　of　channel　members.　The　results　show　that,　1)　information　sharing　is　good　for　retailer　but　not　necessarily　for　manufacturer;　2)　The　manufacturer＇s　ability　of　information　forecasting　enables　the　channel　members　to　achieve　Pareto　improvement　under　some　conditions.　©　2020,　Editorial　Board　of　Journal　of　Systems　Engineering　Society　of　China.　All　right　reserved.