The　scattered　and　small-scale　production　mode　together　with　asymmetric　business　information　results　in　the　Chinese　peasants’　weak　position　in　the　agricultural　supply　chain.　Chinese　government　has　implemented　some　effective　measures　to　safeguard　the　peasants’　benefits.　By　establishing　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　among　the　peasants,　agricultural　products　dealers　and　government　under　the　policy　of　price　subsidy,　the　effects　of　social　benefits,　the　size　of　the　penalty　and　the　transaction　volume　on　the　evolutionary　stable　strategy　is　discussed.　A　simulation　instance　is　also　given　to　demonstrate　the　evolutionary　game　model.　The　results　shows　that　the　probability　of　government　regulation　is　not　only　related　to　the　social　benefits　of　regulation,　but　also　affected　by　the　transaction　volume　of　agricultural　products,　the　peasants　benefits　can　be　protected　effectively　by　the　price　subsidy　policy　and　the　probability　of　the　agricultural　products　dealers　choosing　fraud　strategy　declines　with　the　increase　of　penalty　and　increases　with　the　transaction　volume　of　agricultural　products.　Copyright　©　2020,　IGI　Global.