Although　the　influence　of　various　corporate　governance　mechanisms　on　earnings　management　has　been　analyzed　in　many　studies,　few　studies　have　been　made　on　the　formalization　of　corporate　governance　which　is,　however,　one　of　the　important　problems　after　the　promulgation　of　the　Sarbanes-Oxley　Act.　In　this　paper,　a　game　model　is　built　to　analyze　the　influence　of　the　formalization　of　corporate　governance　on　earnings　management.　It　is　believed　that　there　is　obvious　correlation　between　the　degree　of　the　formalization　of　corporate　governance　and　the　degree　of　earnings　management　in　this　paper.　The　greater　the　corporate　governance　is　formalized,　the　bigger　the　difference　in　degree　of　managerial　opportunism　between　reputation　and　reality　will　be,　and　the　less　the　regulators　and　investors　will　suspect　managerial　opportunism.　Thus,　the　more　difficultly　supervisors　and　investors　understand　the　behavior　of　earnings　management,　the　higher　the　degree　of　manager＇s　earnings　management　will　be.　Managers　have　incentive　to　formalize　corporate　governance　actively,　because,　besides　the　demand　of　supervisors　and　investors,　the　greater　the　formalization　of　corporate　governance　is,　the　higher　utility　the　earnings　management　will　bring　to　managers.　The　conclusion　in　this　paper　can　provide　some　policy　recommendations　for　strengthening　and　improving　supervision　in　the　post-Enron　era:　1.　Besides　promulgating　relevant　laws　and　regulations,　proactive　supervision　shall　be　strengthened;　2.　Supervision　on　the　so-called　Star　Enterprises　shall　be　strengthened　in　times　of　prosperity;　3.　News　and　public　opinion　shall　play　a　proper　role　in　corporate　governance.