Cooperative　games　with　coalitions＇　values　represented　by　intervals,　which　are　often　called　interval-valued　(IV)　cooperative　games,　have　currently　become　a　hot　research　topic.　For　single-valued　solutions　of　IV　cooperative　games,　if　the　Moore＇s　interval　subtraction　were　used,　then　some　unreasonable　conclusions　and　issues　result.　This　paper　focuses　on　developing　a　simplified　method　without　using　the　Moore＇s　interval　subtraction　for　solving　the　IV　equal　division　values　and　IV　equal　surplus　division　values　of　IV　cooperative　games.　In　the　methods,　through　defining　some　weaker　coalition　monotonicity-like　conditions,　it　is　proven　that　both　equal　division　value　and　equal　surplus　division　value　of　the　defined　associated　cooperative　game　are　monotonic　and　non-decreasing　functions　of　the　parameter　c＇.　Hence,　the　IV　equal　division　values　and　IV　equal　surplus　division　values　of　IV　cooperative　games　can　be　directly　and　explicitly　obtained　through　determining　their　lower　and　upper　bounds　by　using　the　lower　and　upper　bounds　of　the　IV　coalitions＇　values,　respectively.　The　method　proposed　in　this　paper　uses　coalition　monotonicity-like　conditions　rather　than　the　Moore＇s　interval　subtraction　and　hereby　can　effectively　avoid　the　issues　resulting　from　it.　Moreover,　some　important　properties　of　the　IV　equal　division　values　and　IV　equal　surplus　division　values　of　IV　cooperative　games　are　discussed.　Finally,　real　numerical　examples　are　used　to　demonstrate　the　feasibility　and　applicability　of　the　methods　proposed　in　this　paper.