The　goal　of　this　paper　is　to　develop　a　direct　method　for　computing　interval　Banzhaf　values　for　a　class　of　interval　cooperative　games.　In　this　method,　it　is　proven　that　the　Banzhaf　values　of　the　associated　cooperative　games　of　interval　cooperative　games　are　monotonic　and　non-decreasing　functions　of　coalitions＇　payoffs　under　weaker　coalition　monotonicity-like　conditions.　So　the　interval　Banzhaf　values　can　be　explicitly　obtained　through　using　only　the　lower　and　upper　bounds　of　the　coalitions＇　interval　payoffs,　respectively.　The　proposed　method　does　not　employ　interval　subtractions　and　hereby　can　effectively　avoid　the　irrational　issues　such　as　irreversibility　and　uncertainty　enlargement.　We　prove　some　important　and　desirable　properties　of　the　interval　Banzhaf　values　and　illustrate　the　applicability　and　validity　of　the　proposed　method　with　a　numerical　example.