In　this　paper,　we　propose　a　new　efficient　value　for　transferable　utility　cooperative　games　with　a　coalition　structure.　It　first　assigns　to　every　player　his　Aumann-Dreze　value　and　then　allocates　the　remainder　of　the　worth　of　the　grand　coalition　among　players　equally.　As　it　is　identical　with　the　Aumann-Dreze　value　for　coalitional　games　with　a　singleton　coalition　structure,　we　call　it　the　egalitarian　efficient　extension　of　the　Aumann-Dreze　value.　We　provide　three　axiomatizations　of　it　and　compare　it　with　other　well-known　efficient　coalitional　values,　especially　the　Owen　value　and　the　two-step　Shapley　value.