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Abstract:
In this paper, we propose a new efficient value for transferable utility cooperative games with a coalition structure. It first assigns to every player his Aumann-Dreze value and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition among players equally. As it is identical with the Aumann-Dreze value for coalitional games with a singleton coalition structure, we call it the egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Dreze value. We provide three axiomatizations of it and compare it with other well-known efficient coalitional values, especially the Owen value and the two-step Shapley value.
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Source :
JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
ISSN: 0022-3239
Year: 2019
Issue: 3
Volume: 181
Page: 1033-1052
1 . 3 8 8
JCR@2019
1 . 6 0 0
JCR@2023
ESI Discipline: ENGINEERING;
ESI HC Threshold:150
JCR Journal Grade:2
CAS Journal Grade:3
Cited Count:
WoS CC Cited Count: 9
SCOPUS Cited Count: 11
ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List: 0 Unfold All
WanFang Cited Count:
Chinese Cited Count:
30 Days PV: 3
Affiliated Colleges: