In　this　paper,　we　propose　a　new　efficient　value　for　transferable　utility　cooperative　games　with　a　coalition　structure.　It　first　assigns　to　every　player　his　Aumann–Drèze　value　and　then　allocates　the　remainder　of　the　worth　of　the　grand　coalition　among　players　equally.　As　it　is　identical　with　the　Aumann–Drèze　value　for　coalitional　games　with　a　singleton　coalition　structure,　we　call　it　the　egalitarian　efficient　extension　of　the　Aumann–Drèze　value.　We　provide　three　axiomatizations　of　it　and　compare　it　with　other　well-known　efficient　coalitional　values,　especially　the　Owen　value　and　the　two-step　Shapley　value.　©　2018,　Springer　Science+Business　Media,　LLC,　part　of　Springer　Nature.