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学者姓名：李启洋
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Abstract ：
In reality, it is common for retailers to resell the upstream suppliers' national brands while at the same time introducing their private labels to compete with them, usually referred to as private label encroachment. Private label encroachment enhances the channel power of retailers and give them higher leverage during wholesale price negotiations with the suppliers. This paper examines the optimal timing of wholesale price negotiations in a co-opetitive distribution channel comprising a supplier and a retailer by incorporating six representative negotiation timings in which the wholesale price can be negotiated earlier/later than or simultaneous with the quantity decisions of the retailer. We obtain serval interesting results. First, we find that, if the supplier negotiates wholesale price with the retailer before the latter determines the order quantity of NB product (i.e., denoted as non-order-based negotiation type), then a negotiation power shrinking (amplifying) effect for the supplier (retailer) will arise, which impairs (enhances) the supplier's (retailer's) power to split the remaining profit (i.e., the total surplus after extracting all supply chain parties' reservation profits). Second, we find that three negotiation timings are most preferred by the supplier, and the supplier's preferences over the three timings are shaped by the interplay between the negotiation power shrinking effect and the change in the size of the remaining profit. Regarding the retailer, it can be better-off when the wholesale price negotiation is earlier than the order quantity decisions.
Keyword ：
Co-opetition Co-opetition Negotiation timing Negotiation timing Private label encroachment Private label encroachment Supply chain power Supply chain power
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| GB/T 7714 | Li, Qiyang , Li, Haoxiang , Lei, Chen . Strategic analysis of optimal negotiation timing in a co-opetitive distribution channel with private label encroachment [J]. | ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH , 2024 . |
| MLA | Li, Qiyang 等. "Strategic analysis of optimal negotiation timing in a co-opetitive distribution channel with private label encroachment" . | ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH (2024) . |
| APA | Li, Qiyang , Li, Haoxiang , Lei, Chen . Strategic analysis of optimal negotiation timing in a co-opetitive distribution channel with private label encroachment . | ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH , 2024 . |
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Abstract ：
Restaurants have traditionally operated offline only, but the growth of food delivery platforms has prompted a shift toward online sales. In practice, consumers who share digital coupons offered by the platforms (e.g. Uber Eats and Meituan) in social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and WeChat) will be rewarded for the social traffic, which effectively attracts many restaurants to open online store. However, this also leads to intensified competition with the restaurant's physical (offline) store. In this article, we formulate the restaurant's tradeoffs among platform traffic benefits, consumers' heterogeneous utility, and the platform's commission in the online selling decision. Interestingly, we find that the increased platform traffic may be harmful to the restaurant, and even the entire channel system. The platform offering high subsidies may trap restaurants in a pricing dilemma. We also find that restaurants' online selling will induce a negative externality due to online/offline order congestion, but it will not qualitatively change the main findings.
Keyword ：
channel coopetition channel coopetition network externality network externality platform partnership platform partnership social traffic social traffic
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| GB/T 7714 | Niu, Baozhuang , Chen, Lei , Li, Qiyang et al. Restaurants' Platform Partnership for Social Promotion and Resilient Revenue: Is Reward-Based Traffic Really Rewardful? [J]. | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT , 2024 . |
| MLA | Niu, Baozhuang et al. "Restaurants' Platform Partnership for Social Promotion and Resilient Revenue: Is Reward-Based Traffic Really Rewardful?" . | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (2024) . |
| APA | Niu, Baozhuang , Chen, Lei , Li, Qiyang , Zeng, Fanzhuo . Restaurants' Platform Partnership for Social Promotion and Resilient Revenue: Is Reward-Based Traffic Really Rewardful? . | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT , 2024 . |
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Abstract ：
Consider a remanufacturing system consisting of a brand, a new component supplier (Supplier N), and a remanufactured component supplier (Supplier R). The brand priorly purchases remanufactured components and then assembles them into final products, while Supplier R collects the end-of-life products with random residual quality and then produces them to be "as good as new" components at a diseconomy cost based on the residual quality. Supplier R has the option to provide order fulfillment commitment before production (Scenario O), or, do not provide such a commitment, reserving the right to limit the proportion of the orders to save production costs although it may drive the brand to emergently purchase the new components (Scenario L). Specifically, in Scenario L, Supplier R can set a strict residual quality standard which saves the remanufacturing cost and constrains the brand's order quantity. We reveal that constraining the brand's order quantity will not be the optimal choice for Supplier R, because the overreliance on the limited-supply threat will distort Supplier R's wholesale price decision, resulting in significant profit loss. However, the supply chain system can perform better with the quantity constraint, because it concentrates the channel power in the hands of a single decision maker, which enables the decisions made more closely to the first-best level.
Keyword ：
Collecting quality standard Collecting quality standard Diseconomy of remanufacturing scale cost Diseconomy of remanufacturing scale cost Game-theoretic model Game-theoretic model Supply resilience Supply resilience
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| GB/T 7714 | Zeng, Fanzhuo , Niu, Baozhuang , Qi, Zhiyuan et al. Will you stick to a high-quality collecting standard? order fulfillment vs. limited supply in diseconomy-cost-mattered remanufacturing operations [J]. | COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING , 2023 , 184 . |
| MLA | Zeng, Fanzhuo et al. "Will you stick to a high-quality collecting standard? order fulfillment vs. limited supply in diseconomy-cost-mattered remanufacturing operations" . | COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 184 (2023) . |
| APA | Zeng, Fanzhuo , Niu, Baozhuang , Qi, Zhiyuan , Zhang, Jianhua , Jin, Yong , Li, Qiyang . Will you stick to a high-quality collecting standard? order fulfillment vs. limited supply in diseconomy-cost-mattered remanufacturing operations . | COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING , 2023 , 184 . |
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