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学者姓名：李启洋
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Abstract ：
Restaurants have traditionally operated offline only, but the growth of food delivery platforms has prompted a shift toward online sales. In practice, consumers who share digital coupons offered by the platforms (e.g. Uber Eats and Meituan) in social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and WeChat) will be rewarded for the social traffic, which effectively attracts many restaurants to open online store. However, this also leads to intensified competition with the restaurant's physical (offline) store. In this article, we formulate the restaurant's tradeoffs among platform traffic benefits, consumers' heterogeneous utility, and the platform's commission in the online selling decision. Interestingly, we find that the increased platform traffic may be harmful to the restaurant, and even the entire channel system. The platform offering high subsidies may trap restaurants in a pricing dilemma. We also find that restaurants' online selling will induce a negative externality due to online/offline order congestion, but it will not qualitatively change the main findings.
Keyword ：
channel coopetition channel coopetition network externality network externality platform partnership platform partnership social traffic social traffic
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| GB/T 7714 | Niu, Baozhuang , Chen, Lei , Li, Qiyang et al. Restaurants' Platform Partnership for Social Promotion and Resilient Revenue: Is Reward-Based Traffic Really Rewardful? [J]. | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT , 2024 . |
| MLA | Niu, Baozhuang et al. "Restaurants' Platform Partnership for Social Promotion and Resilient Revenue: Is Reward-Based Traffic Really Rewardful?" . | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (2024) . |
| APA | Niu, Baozhuang , Chen, Lei , Li, Qiyang , Zeng, Fanzhuo . Restaurants' Platform Partnership for Social Promotion and Resilient Revenue: Is Reward-Based Traffic Really Rewardful? . | PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT , 2024 . |
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Abstract ：
Consider a remanufacturing system consisting of a brand, a new component supplier (Supplier N), and a remanufactured component supplier (Supplier R). The brand priorly purchases remanufactured components and then assembles them into final products, while Supplier R collects the end-of-life products with random residual quality and then produces them to be "as good as new" components at a diseconomy cost based on the residual quality. Supplier R has the option to provide order fulfillment commitment before production (Scenario O), or, do not provide such a commitment, reserving the right to limit the proportion of the orders to save production costs although it may drive the brand to emergently purchase the new components (Scenario L). Specifically, in Scenario L, Supplier R can set a strict residual quality standard which saves the remanufacturing cost and constrains the brand's order quantity. We reveal that constraining the brand's order quantity will not be the optimal choice for Supplier R, because the overreliance on the limited-supply threat will distort Supplier R's wholesale price decision, resulting in significant profit loss. However, the supply chain system can perform better with the quantity constraint, because it concentrates the channel power in the hands of a single decision maker, which enables the decisions made more closely to the first-best level.
Keyword ：
Collecting quality standard Collecting quality standard Diseconomy of remanufacturing scale cost Diseconomy of remanufacturing scale cost Game-theoretic model Game-theoretic model Supply resilience Supply resilience
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| GB/T 7714 | Zeng, Fanzhuo , Niu, Baozhuang , Qi, Zhiyuan et al. Will you stick to a high-quality collecting standard? order fulfillment vs. limited supply in diseconomy-cost-mattered remanufacturing operations [J]. | COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING , 2023 , 184 . |
| MLA | Zeng, Fanzhuo et al. "Will you stick to a high-quality collecting standard? order fulfillment vs. limited supply in diseconomy-cost-mattered remanufacturing operations" . | COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 184 (2023) . |
| APA | Zeng, Fanzhuo , Niu, Baozhuang , Qi, Zhiyuan , Zhang, Jianhua , Jin, Yong , Li, Qiyang . Will you stick to a high-quality collecting standard? order fulfillment vs. limited supply in diseconomy-cost-mattered remanufacturing operations . | COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING , 2023 , 184 . |
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