We　investigate　how　cross-border　cooperation　formed　by　the　Multilateral　Memorandum　of　Understanding　(MMoU)　affects　tax　avoidance　of　foreign　firms　cross-listed　in　the　U.S.　Prior　studies　show　that　the　MMoU　enhances　U.S.　SEC＇s　regulatory　oversight　of　foreign　firms　and　increases　such　firms＇　corporate　governance.　We　utilize　data　from　27　jurisdictions　from　2000　to　2009　and　find　that　U.S.　cross-listed　firms　mitigate　tax　avoidance　more　than　do　their　home-listed　peers　after　their　home　jurisdictions　become　signatories　of　the　MMoU.　Our　further　analyses　reveal　that　improved　information　environment　and　enhanced　foreign　institutional　investor　monitoring　are　two　possible　underlying　mechanisms,　consistent　with　the　complementarity　theory　of　tax　avoidance　that　self-serving　managers　can　employ　tax　avoidance　to　divert　assets　when　corporate　governance　is　ineffective.　We　also　show　that　the　effect　of　the　MMoU　increases　with　U.S.　IRS　monitoring　and　the　strength　of　institutional　regimes　in　foreign　firms＇　home　jurisdictions.　Collectively,　our　findings　elucidate　unintended　consequences　of　the　MMoU　and　provide　implications　for　practitioners　and　regulators.