The　imbalance　of　rural　human–land　relationships　has　become　a　notable　problem　in　China’s　urbanization　process.　The　dual　urban–rural　system　is　widely　regarded　as　the　crucial　factor　contributing　to　this　problem　in　China.　Although　the　significance　of　institutional　forces　has　been　substantially　recognized,　the　rural　homestead　system　seems　to　be　generally　under-evaluated　in　this　issue.　Most　of　the　previous　literature　focuses　on　the　dual　household　registration　system,　while　the　effects　and　the　detailed　mechanisms　of　the　rural　homestead　system　on　human–land　relationships　lack　depth　in　research.　The　objective　of　this　research　is　to　help　fill　this　gap　in　the　literature　on　the　complex　effects　and　the　detailed　mechanisms　of　the　rural　homestead　system　on　rural　human–land　relationships.　In　view　of　this,　this　paper　establishes　a　conceptual　framework　on　the　basis　of　land　function　theory　and　public　domain　of　property　rights　theory　and　proposes　two　mechanism　hypotheses:　one　is　the　land　attachment　mechanism　of　farmers’　rights　and　interests　(LAM),　the　other　is　the　land　finance　preference　mechanism　of　local　governments　(LFPM).　Then,　this　article　examines　them　empirically　using　the　panel　model　with　the　data　of　41　cities　from　2010　to　2021　in　the　Yangtze　River　Delta　of　China.　The　main　conclusions　are　as　follows:　(1)　LAM　promotes　the　imbalance　of　rural　human–land　relationships　due　to　the　attachment　of　farmer’s　social　security　rights　and　property　expectant　interests　to　the　rural　homesteads;　(2)　LFPM　drives　the　imbalance　of　rural　human–land　relationships,　owing　to　both　the　preference　of　land　transfer　revenue　and　the　exclusion　of　rural　migrants’　citizenship　financial　cost　on　local　governments;　(3)　the　moderating　effects　suggest　that　LFPM　can　strengthen　the　effect　of　LAM,　and　the　spatial　Durbin　model　results　show　that　both　LAM　and　LFPM　have　spatial　spillover　effects.　It　is　hoped　that　the　findings　will　provide　a　reference　for　deepening　the　rural　homestead　system　reform.　©　2024　by　the　authors.