E-waste　production　is　exploding　as　a　result　of　rising　demand　for　electronics　and　a　faster　rate　of　replacement.　A　crucial,　yet　unresolved　issue　is　how　to　encourage　cooperation　among　primary　agents　in　the　recycling　of　e-waste.　To　examine　a　multi-agent　collaborative　model　of　e-waste　recycling　among　local　governments,　producers,　and　consumers,　this　research　employs　the　techniques　of　evolutionary　games　and　system　dynamics.　Evolutionary　games　are　used　to　analyze　the　strategy　choice　results,　while　system　dynamics　are　adopted　to　depict　the　decisionmaking　processes.　Overall,　we　find　that　rewards　and　penalties　affect　the　stability　and　efficiency　of　the　collaborative　model　of　e-waste　recycling　and　that　the　greater　the　correlation　between　the　rewards-and-penalties　mechanism　and　the　strategies,　the　more　stable　the　model　is.　Specifically,　the　results　show　that:　(1)　static　rewards-and-penalties　mechanism　is　likely　to　breed　mutants　and　thus　is　not　conducive　to　stable　cooperation;　(2)　dynamic　rewards-and-penalties　mechanism　can　inhibit　the　instability　of　e-waste　recycling　model,　but　only　60%　of　producers　are　willing　to　build　an　e-waste　recycling　system;　(3)　dynamic　rewards-and-penalties　optimizing　mechanism　can　ensure　that　producers　and　consumers　wholeheartedly　work　for　e-waste　recycling　consistently　without　local　governments　regulation;　(4)　according　to　the　sensitivity　analysis,　increasing　the　amount　of　rewards　and　penalties　can　facilitate　faster　evolution　of　collaboration　in　the　e-waste　recycling　system.　Finally,　this　study　makes　implications　for　promoting　efficiency　and　stability　in　e-waste　recycling　among　local　governments,　producers,　and　consumers.