In　this　study,　we　provide　evidence　on　the　effect　of　introducing　state-owned　shareholders　in　non-state-owned　enterprises　from　the　perspective　of　firms＇　short-term　debt　for　long-term　investment.　Using　Chinese　Non-SOEs　listed　companies　from　2010　to　2020　as　the　sample,　we　find　that　the　introduction　of　state-owned　shareholders　in　Non-SOEs　significantly　promotes　the　level　of　short-term　debt　for　long-term　investment.　We　also　find　the　scale　of　short-term　debt,　the　scale　of　long-term　investment　and　the　quality　of　internal　control　play　a　mediating　effect　in　the　relationship　between　the　mixed-ownership　reform　and　the　short-term　debt　for　long-term　investment.　Regional　marketization　level,　economic　downcycle,　regional　banks　competition　level,　the　economic　policy　uncertainty　and　the　firms＇　market　competition　power　can　influence　the　effect　of　introducing　state-owned　shareholders　in　Non-SOEs.　Further,　our　analysis　of　the　economic　consequences　of　the　short-term　debt　for　long-term　investment　implemented　by　Non-SOEs　demonstrates　that　it　indeed　can　reduce　the　cost　of　debt　financing.　Overall,　the　results　shed　light　on　the　effectiveness　of　the　mixed-ownership　reform,　and　our　findings　enrich　the　literature　of　investment　and　financing　strategy　and　provides　empirical　evidence　to　promote　the　mixed-ownership　reform.　©　2023　Elsevier　Inc.