Federated　learning　(FL)　has　achieved　state-of-the-art　performance　in　distributed　learning　tasks　with　privacy　requirements.　However,　it　has　been　discovered　that　FL　is　vulnerable　to　adversarial　attacks.　The　typical　gradient　inversion　attacks　primarily　focus　on　attempting　to　obtain　the　client＇s　private　input　in　a　white-box　manner,　where　the　adversary　is　assumed　to　be　either　the　client　or　the　server.　However,　if　both　the　clients　and　the　server　are　honest　and　fully　trusted,　is　the　FL　secure?　In　this　paper,　we　propose　a　novel　method　called　External　Gradient　Inversion　Attack　(EGIA)　in　the　grey-box　settings.　Specifically,　we　concentrate　on　the　point　that　public-shared　gradients　in　FL　are　always　transmitted　through　the　intermediary　nodes,　which　has　been　widely　ignored.　On　this　basis,　we　demonstrate　that　an　external　adversary　can　reconstruct　the　private　input　using　gradients　even　if　both　the　clients　and　the　server　are　honest　and　fully　trusted.　We　also　provide　a　comprehensive　theoretical　analysis　of　the　black-box　attack　scenario　in　which　the　adversary　has　only　the　gradients.　We　perform　extensive　experiments　on　multiple　real-world　datasets　to　test　the　effectiveness　of　EGIA.　The　outcomes　of　our　experiments　validate　that　the　EGIA　method　is　highly　effective.