This　paper　proposes　a　service-oriented　manufacturing　strategy　in　a　two-echelon　supply　chain　with　random　demand.　When　there　is　no　inventory　for　the　retailer　to　meet　demand,　customers　can　choose　to　order　products　through　the　retailer　and　products　will　be　delivered　to　them　by　the　manufacturer　directly　in　the　promised　time,　and　we　call　this　delivery　service　in　service-oriented　manufacturing.　We　employ　a　Stackelberg　game-theoretic　model　to　analyse　the　procurement　quantity　and　delivery　time　decisions　by　the　manufacturer　as　the　leader　and　the　retailer　as　the　follower.　Using　the　performance　of　the　pure-manufacturing　strategy　as　a　benchmark,　our　main　results　follow.　First,　the　equilibrium　strategies　of　the　two　players　are　obtained.　Clear　decision　rules　are　also　given.　Second,　delivery　service　in　service-oriented　manufacturing　can　be　an　effective　way　to　reduce　the　holding　cost　of　the　retailer.　Third,　we　describe　the　customer　loss　caused　by　waiting　and　find　how　the　manufacturer　influences　procurement　quantity　of　the　retailer　through　the　decision　of　delivery　time.　Finally,　delivery　service　in　service-oriented　manufacturing　cannot　always　improve　the　profit　of　the　manufacturer　and　the　retailer.　We　give　guidance　for　managers　to　provide　it.