Exploiting　the　quasi-natural　experiment　of　the　social　insurance　collection　system　reform　implemented　in　China　in　2000,　based　on　data　from　China＇s　industrial　enterprise　database　from　1998　to　2006,　we　use　the　difference-in-differences　method　to　test　the　impact　of　changing　the　social　insurance　collection　institution　on　corporate　tax　evasion.　We　find　that　changing　the　social　insurance　collection　institution　from　the　social　security　department　to　the　local　tax　department　significantly　deters　corporate　tax　evasion.　A　series　of　robustness　tests　also　support　this　conclusion.　The　reason　is　changing　the　social　insurance　collection　institution　to　the　local　tax　department　increases　its＇　social　insurance　information　of　the　enterprise,　and　reduces　the　information　asymmetry　between　the　enterprise　and　the　collection　institution.　Furthermore,　we　find　that　the　impact　of　changing　the　social　insurance　collection　institution　on　corporate　tax　evasion　is　more　evident　in　the　samples　of　labor-intensive　enterprises,　low　labor　cost　enterprises,　and　enterprises　under　the　jurisdiction　of　the　local　tax　department.　These　results　indicate　that　government　institutional　reform　is　a　valid　way　to　reduce　the　information　asymmetry　between　the　government　and　enterprises,　which　will　finally　deter　corporate　tax　evasion.