Despite　a　large　number　of　studies　on　collective　motion,　individuals　are　usually　assumed　to　participate　in　flocking　unconditionally,　and　the　cost　of　communication　with　other　individuals　is　rarely　considered.　In　fact,　individuals　often　need　to　face　a　dichotomous　scenario:　choosing　to　move　together　with　others　and　pay　the　communication　cost,　or　choosing　to　walk　alone　and　have　no　communication　cost.　In　this　paper,　a　modified　Vicsek　model　is　proposed,　in　which　agents　have　different　kinds　of　moving　patterns　depending　on　the　strategies　taken　by　them.　Each　individual　obtains　a　payoff　based　on　the　benefit　of　the　collective　motion　and　the　cost　of　communication　with　neighbors.　Individuals　update　their　strategies　according　to　the　evolutionary　game　theory.　It　is　found　that　not　only　cooperation　can　be　maintained,　but　also　the　highest　synchronization　level　can　be　achieved　at　an　optimal　value　of　communication　radius.　The　influence　of　other　pertinent　quantities　such　as　the　random　noise,　the　relative　cost,　and　the　density　of　agents　have　also　been　investigated　in　detail.　©　2022