We　investigate　whether　abnormal　institutional　attention　(AIA,　measured　following　Ben-Rephael,　Da,　and　Israelsen,　2017)　influences　bank　loans.　First,　we　find　that　AIA　is　positively　related　to　borrowers＇　cumulative　abnormal　returns　around　loan　announcements.　Second,　banks　charge　a　significantly　lower　loan　spread,　require　less　collateral,　and　approve　larger　loans　for　borrowers　with　higher　AIA.　Third,　the　effect　of　AIA　becomes　stronger　when　borrowers　have　high　information　asymmetry　and　weak　market　competition.　Overall,　our　findings　support　the　idea　that　banks　consider　AIA　information　when　making　lending　decisions.