New　energy　vehicles　(NEVs)　are　welcomed　by　both　policymakers　and　consumers　because　of　their　energy　saving　and　low　carbon　properties.　However,　due　to　their　high　production　cost　and　limited　cruising　range,　the　development　of　the　NEV　industry　relies　heavily　on　governments’　cash　subsidy　(CS)　programs.　At　the　same　time,　policymakers　in　several　countries,　including　the　United　States　(California)　and　China,　have　introduced　carbon　regulation　(CR)　to　re-energize　the　NEV　market.　CS　and　CR　have　different　impacts　on　the　consumer　and　production　sides.　To　this　end,　we　propose　a　hybrid　model　combining　the　advantages　of　both.　Through　this　model,　the　impacts　of　different　interventions　on　product　demands,　profits,　carbon　emissions　and　technology　R&D　are　derived:　(1)　CS　always　increases　the　demand　for　NEVs,　while　CR　promotes　NEVs　only　when　NEVs　are　emission　saving;　providing　CS　increases　the　profits　of　the　supply　chain　members,　but　supply　chain　profits　under　CR　show　uncertain　trends;　(2)　CS　reduces　total　emissions　only　if　the　unit　carbon　emission　of　NEVs　is　small　enough,　and　the　effect　of　NEVs’　carbon　quota　on　total　emissions　under　CR　shows　a　similar　trend,　whereas　the　impact　of　carbon　price　on　total　emissions　under　CR　depends　on　specific　thresholds.　Further　results　show　that　when　a　customer　values　NEVs　highly,　the　proposed　hybrid　model　produces　the　lowest　total　emission;　(3)　Optimal　technology　R&D　for　the　cruising　range　of　NEVs　increases　under　CS　if　the　subsidy　provided　is　based　on　the　actual　cruising　range;　otherwise,　CR　performs　better.　The　hybrid　model　shows　potential　in　outperforming　the　other　two　policies　in　terms　of　the　optimal　technology　R&　D;　(4)　Supply　chain　integration　decreases　the　optimal　technology　R&D　in　the　case　of　CR,　whereas　in　the　case　of　CS,　technology　R&D　does　not　vary　with　integration　or　decentralization　of　the　supply　chain.　©　2021　Elsevier　Ltd