Translated Title
Political Connection and Inefficient Investment Based on Dynamic Panel Data
Translated Abstract
The listed companies in the years 2005-2010 were empirically studied .In the first step of measurement of ineffi-cient investment , GMM estimate was made based on the dynamic panel data to get the result which will be used in the next step ;in the second step , regression model was constructed to test the effect of political connection on inefficient investments .Further-more, the effects of political connection in listed companies of different property rights were analyzed .With the study , it was found that:political connection strengthens listed company＇＇s over-investment behavior and restrains their low -investment be-havior;political connection in the state -own companies strengthens over -investment behavior and restrain their low -invest-ment behavior significantly , but this significance only survives in the over -investment behavior of private companies; political connection functions are greater in those companies controlled by the local government than in those controlled by the central gov -ernment.
Translated Keyword
dynamic panel
financial constraints
inefficient investment
political connection
soft budget constraint
Access Number
WF:perioarticalwhqcgydxxb201401027
