Breeding　new　strategic　industry　is　often　a　top-down　government　behavior,　without　considering　the　technology　evolution.　The　evolution　of　technology　process　may　be　inefficient　technology　path　dependence,　which　inhibit　the　development　of　industry.　Stock　of　secondary　knowledge,　features　of　organization　and　invariance　of　consumer　preference　in　short-term　may　lead　to　technology　path　dependence.　In　this　paper　we　explore　technology　change　by　evolutionary　game　theory　and　find　that　different　initial　state　of　evolutionary　game　can　lead　to　different　equilibrium:　in　A　area,　technology　path　dependence　will　occur;　in　C　area,　the　inferior　technology　will　be　replaced.　At　last,　some　suggestions　are　put　forward　to　create　new　technology　path　for　new　strategic　industry:　the　government＇s　property　rights　and　environmental　laws　will　break　the　path　dependence,　and　enterprises　take　compatible　technology　may　help　to　create　a　new　technology　path.　©　2013　IEEE.