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[会议论文]

Bargaining model of mutual deterrence among three players with incomplete information

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author:

Xiao, Y. (Xiao, Y..) [1] | Li, D.-F. (Li, D.-F..) [2]

Indexed by:

Scopus

Abstract:

The tripartite bargaining problem of mutual deterrence has been investigated from the perspective of Rubinstein indefinite bargaining and cooperative game theory. Considering the situation of incomplete information in reality, this paper established a tripartite mutual deterrence bargaining model with unilateral and bilateral incomplete information by introducing incomplete information into the model and defining a discount factor. And particularly, the formula is furnished for calculating the Nash equilibrium distribution of every player under the incomplete information. Finally, an illustrative example is presented to show that the established model is feasible and effective and can provide a new way and method to analyze and solve multi mutual deterrence or conflict problems with incomplete information. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017.

Keyword:

Bargaining; Deterrence; Game theory; Incomplete information

Community:

  • [ 1 ] [Xiao, Y.]College of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, China
  • [ 2 ] [Li, D.-F.]College of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, China

Reprint 's Address:

  • [Li, D.-F.]College of Economics and Management, Fuzhou UniversityChina

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Source :

Communications in Computer and Information Science

ISSN: 1865-0929

Year: 2017

Volume: 758

Page: 40-52

Language: English

Cited Count:

WoS CC Cited Count:

SCOPUS Cited Count: 1

30 Days PV: 1

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