Translated Title
The Collective Value of Transferable Utility Cooperative Games with a Level Structure
Translated Abstract
As an alliance restriction,a level structure is more general than a coalition structure.This paper proposes two definitions of the collective value of transferable utility cooperative games with a level structure.Similar to the ξ value of transferable utility cooperative games with a level structure,the first one defines the collective value from the perspective of multi-step allocation.And similar to the Myerson value of transferable utility cooperative games with a graph structure,the second one defines the collective value from the perspective of communication restriction.The equivalence of these two definitions is proved and an axiomatic characterization of the collective value is given in the paper.Research results enrich solution concepts of transferable utility cooperative games with a level structure,and they can be taken as references to investigate other solutions of transferable utility cooperative games with an alliance restriction.
Translated Keyword
collective value
Cooperative game
level structure
Shapley value
weighted Shapley value
Access Number
WF:perioarticalxtkxysx-zw201701014
