As　an　alliance　form　for　players,　a　level　structure　is　more　general　than　a　coalition　structure.　This　paper　devotes　to　propose　the　multi-step　Shapley　value　of　transferable　utility　cooperative　games　with　a　level　structure.　Concretely,　an　allocation　procedure　and　an　axiomatic　characterization　of　it　are　given.　Additionally,　as　an　equivalent　allocation　procedure,　this　paper　proves　that　it　is　identical　with　the　weighted　Shapley　value　of　an　appropriate　transferable　utility　cooperative　game.　Research　results　extend　the　two-step　Shapley　value　of　transferable　utility　cooperative　games　with　a　coalition　structure,　and　they　can　be　taken　as　references　to　investigate　other　solutions　of　transferable　utility　cooperative　games　with　an　alliance　restriction.　©　2016,　Editorial　Board　of　Journal　of　Systems　Engineering　Society　of　China.　All　right　reserved.