The　main　purpose　of　this　paper　is　to　extend　the　concept　of　generalized　solidarity　values　to　interval-valued　cooperative　games　and　hereby　develop　a　simplified　and　fast　approach　for　solving　a　subclass　of　interval-valued　cooperative　games.　In　this　paper,　we　find　some　weaker　coalition　monotonicity-like　conditions　so　that　the　generalized　solidarity　values　of　the　ff-cooperative　games　associated　with　interval-valued　cooperative　games　are　always　monotonic　and　non-decreasing　functions　of　any　parameter　α　ε　[0;　1].　Thereby　the　intervalvalued　generalized　solidarity　values　can　be　directly　and　explicitly　obtained　by　computing　their　lower　and　upper　bounds　through　only　using　the　lower　and　upper　bounds　of　the　interval-valued　coalitions＇　values,　respectively.　The　developed　method　does　not　use　the　interval　subtraction　and　hereby　can　effectively　avoid　the　issues　resulted　from　it.　Furthermore,　we　discuss　the　effect　of　the　parameter　ξ　on　the　interval-valued　generalized　solidarity　values　of　interval-valued　cooperative　games　and　some　significant　properties　of　interval-valued　generalized　solidarity　values.　©　2020,　American　Institute　of　Mathematical　Sciences.