The　relationship　between　venture　capitalists　and　venture　entrepreneurs　is　a　principal-agent　relationship.　Both　capitalists　and　entrepreneurs　target　at　maximizing　their　own　revenue.　Under　asymmetric　information,　the　short-term　and　long-term　contract　design　for　venture　capital　revenue　allocation　directly　influences　the　initiative　of　venture　entrepreneurs,　and　consequently　affects　the　final　investment　income.　With　the　improved　principal-agent　model,　this　research　investigates,　from　perspectives　of　venture　capitalists　and　venture　entrepreneurs,　the　optimal　contract　designs　for　short-　and　long-term　venture　capitals.　Furthermore,　the　choices　of　optimal　contract　arrangement　for　each　case　are　derived.　This　optimal　contract　arrangement　can　overcome　the　revenue　conflict　between　venture　capitalists　and　venture　entrepreneurs　and　arrive　at　the　condition　of　mutual　incentive.　©　2011　IEEE.