The　aim　of　this　paper　is　to　discuss　a　bargaining　problem　between　sellers　and　buyers　in　the　case　of　the　final　price　of　the　house　for　sale　in　the　second-hand　house　market.　Two　bargaining　models　are　established　for　the　sellers　and　buyers　in　indefinite　period　and　finite　period.　For　the　indefinite　period,　the　complete　equilibrium　solution　of　the　bargaining　game　between　the　buyers　and　sellers　is　obtained.　Hereby,　imposing　some　constraints　on　the　time,　the　game　equilibrium　solution　on　the　second　stage　is　obtained.　At　the　same　time,　a　multiple　game　model　is　constructed　and　the　commence　point　is　discussed.　The　result　shows　that　the　game　between　sellers　and　buyers　depends　on　the　ratio　of　each　one’s　discount　factor.　The　time　and　commitment　between　sellers　and　buyers　increase　the　sellers’　cost,　hence　the　final　price　can　only　be　implemented　within　a　certain　range,　which　is　related　with　the　proposal　cost　of　sellers,　the　number　of　games,　and　the　punishment　cost　in　each　round.　©　Springer　Nature　Singapore　Pte　Ltd.　2017.