The　tripartite　bargaining　problem　of　mutual　deterrence　has　been　investigated　from　the　perspective　of　Rubinstein　indefinite　bargaining　and　cooperative　game　theory.　Considering　the　situation　of　incomplete　information　in　reality,　this　paper　established　a　tripartite　mutual　deterrence　bargaining　model　with　unilateral　and　bilateral　incomplete　information　by　introducing　incomplete　information　into　the　model　and　defining　a　discount　factor.　And　particularly,　the　formula　is　furnished　for　calculating　the　Nash　equilibrium　distribution　of　every　player　under　the　incomplete　information.　Finally,　an　illustrative　example　is　presented　to　show　that　the　established　model　is　feasible　and　effective　and　can　provide　a　new　way　and　method　to　analyze　and　solve　multi　mutual　deterrence　or　conflict　problems　with　incomplete　information.　©　Springer　Nature　Singapore　Pte　Ltd.　2017.