Indexed by:
Abstract:
Vehicle-based crowdsourcing (VBC) is a sourcing model in which crowdsourcers hire a bunch of vehicle users to accomplish sensing tasks. The design of the incentive mechanism in VBC is necessary because the amount of the sensing tasks accomplished depend on the scale and the willingness of the participants. In general, every sensing task has two dimensions, which are the time dimension and place dimension. That is to say, each task in VBC corresponds to different Places of Interest(PoIs) and time slot. However, most of the existing incentive mechanisms only allow users to enter the system one by one without considering both the two characteristics of the sensing task, only take into account the user's margin contribution value rather than the margin contribution ratio. On the contrary, we fully consider the user's margin contribution ratio, which takes into account the system's requirements for the task and the ability of the user to do the task. In addition, our mechanism can be effectively applied to a time-sensitive task scenario. In this paper, we propose an online incentive mechanism, RIM, with the properties: truthfulness, budget feasible, computational efficiency, individual rationality, consumer sovereignty. With extensive simulation, we show that the results and the theoretic analysis are in accord. In addition, the proposed mechanism outperforms the existing methods. © 2018 IEEE.
Keyword:
Reprint 's Address:
Email:
Version:
Source :
Year: 2018
Page: 522-527
Language: English
Cited Count:
WoS CC Cited Count: 0
SCOPUS Cited Count: 3
ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List: 0 Unfold All
WanFang Cited Count:
Chinese Cited Count:
30 Days PV: 3
Affiliated Colleges: