To　reveal　whether　the　order　of　supply　chains＇　competition　exerts　an　effect　on　the　their　profits　and　whether　the　repeated　game　interferences　this　effect,　the　paper　builds　a　Stackelberg　game　model　constructed　by　two　supply　chains　with　each　containing　a　supplier　and　a　retailer　based　on　the　previous　studies.　Through　comparing　respective　profits　of　the　leading　and　following　supply　chain　represented　by　＇Copycat＇,　this　paper　concludes　that　the　following　supply　chain　is　more　likely　to　gain　more　profits　than　the　leading　one　in　this　case,　and　this　advantage　is　determined　by　the　order　of　decision-making　itself.　Under　repeated　games,　the　possibility　of　the　following　supply　chain　to　be　more　profitable　and　the　approaches　to　make　decisions　will　be　related　to　the　substitutable　coefficient.