Impact　of　aspiration　is　ubiquitous　in　social　and　biological　disciplines.　In　this　work,　we　try　to　explore　the　impact　of　such　a　trait　on　voluntary　prisoners＇　dilemma　game　via　a　selection　parameter　w.　w=0　returns　the　traditional　version　of　random　selection.　For　positive　w,　the　opponent　of　high　payoff　will　be　selected;　while　negative　w　means　that　the　partner　of　low　payoff　will　be　chosen.　We　find　that　for　positive　w,　cooperation　will　be　greatly　promoted　in　the　interval　of　small　b,　at　variance　cooperation　is　inhibited　with　large　b.　For　negative　w,　cooperation　is　fully　restrained,　irrespective　of　b　value.　It　is　found　that　the　positive　impact　of　preferential　selection　is　suppressed　by　the　voluntary　strategy　in　prisoner＇s　dilemma.　These　observations　can　be　supported　by　the　spatial　patterns.　Our　work　may　shed　light　on　the　emergence　and　persistence　of　cooperation　with　voluntary　participation　in　social　dilemma.　©　2014　Elsevier　B.V.　All　rights　reserved.