In　this　paper,　we　study　the　effects　of　reputation-based　investment　strategy　on　cooperation　in　the　spatial　public　goods　games.　The　investment　of　one　player　to　a　particular　group　depends　on　the　reputation　of　the　group　organizer.　We　define　a　player＇s　reputation　as　the　frequency　of　cooperation　in　the　past　few　time　steps.　Our　results　show　that　the　cooperation　level　can　be　remarkably　enhanced　if　a　player　invests　more　in　the　group　organized　by　a　higher-reputation　leader.　We　explain　this　phenomenon　by　analyzing　the　income　gap　between　cooperators　and　defectors　at　the　interface　that　separates　clusters　of　the　two　competing　strategies.　To　have　an　intuitive　understanding,　we　plot　the　snapshots　of　spatial　distributions　of　players　with　different　reputation.　The　effects　of　the　memory　length　are　also　studied.　©　2019　Elsevier　B.V.