A　strategic　analysis　is　conducted　to　incorporate　corporate　social　responsibility　(CSR)　considerations　into　managerial　incentive　design　in　a　duopoly　where　each　firm　comprises　an　owner　and　a　manager.　Consumer　surplus　is　adopted　to　represent　the　firms＇　CSR　concerns　and　a　CSR-related　incentive　is　introduced　to　accommodate　both　profit　and　consumer　surplus.　Bertrand　and　Cournot　competition　modes　are　discussed　with　the　firms＇　products　being　complementary,　independent,　or　substitutable.　We　first　examine　the　equilibrium　of　CSR-related　incentive　design　and,　then,　analyze　how　CSR-related　incentives　affect　the　firms＇　profitability　and　CSR　performance,　measured　by　consumer　surplus　and　social　welfare.　(C)　2015　Elsevier　Ltd.　All　rights　reserved.