In　order　to　address　challenges　in　the　sustainable　development　of　transportation,　economy,　and　environment,　governments　of　China　and　conventional　automobile　manufacturers　are　extremely　concerned　about　the　development　of　the　electric　vehicle　(EV)　manufacturing　industry　and　market.　However,　owing　to　the　limitations　of　EVs　and　the　government　economic　policies　on　decreasing　subsidies　in　China,　many　manufacturers　are　worried　about　entering　the　EV　market.　Given　the　low　consumer　preference　for　EVs,　using　a　leader-follower　Stackelberg　game　model,　we　investigate　the　impact　of　government　a　subsidy　on　the　optimal　production　and　pricing　decisions　of　an　auto　manufacturer　who　could　produce　both　EVs　and　conventional　vehicles.　We　characterize　whether/under　what　conditions　the　manufacturer＇s　decision　to　offer　EV　products　under　government　subsidy,　whilst　increasing　its　profits　(a　win-win　situation).　On　the　policy　side,　we　delineate　how　government　a　subsidy　can　be　set　to　realize　the　inherent　economic,　environmental,　and　social　benefits　of　EV　production　(the　triple　win　of　EV　production).　We　further　investigate　the　impact　of　EV　manufacturing-and　society-related　factors　on　the　balance　among　manufacturer　profits,　environmental　impact　and　social　welfare.　This　study　also　finds　that　the　adoption　of　EVs　is　not　bound　to　be　beneficial　for　the　environment.