Indexed by:
Abstract:
Presently, a conventional coalition structure can no more cover all the types of cooperative structures in practice, external cooperation between the coalitions also affects the payoff allocation between the participants. We propose a solution to solve the bargaining problem with level structure by defining for each coalition and each level. The solution concentrates on the bargaining of the coalitions with each other at each level. Furthermore, we discuss the applications of this solution to bankruptcy games with level structure. The proposed solution generalizes the bargaining solution with conventional coalition structure, which can be utilized in more cooperative types with level structures. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
Keyword:
Reprint 's Address:
Email:
Version:
Source :
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
ISSN: 1875-6891
Year: 2019
Issue: 2
Volume: 12
Page: 1255-1260
1 . 8 3 8
JCR@2019
2 . 5 0 0
JCR@2023
ESI Discipline: COMPUTER SCIENCE;
ESI HC Threshold:162
JCR Journal Grade:3
CAS Journal Grade:4
Cited Count:
SCOPUS Cited Count:
ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List: 0 Unfold All
WanFang Cited Count:
Chinese Cited Count:
30 Days PV: 2
Affiliated Colleges: