Internet　public　opinion　events　at　universities　in　China　occurred　frequently,　creating　painful　repercussions　for　reputation　and　stability　of　colleges　and　universities.　To　better　cope　with　the　problem,　this　paper　explores　an　evolutionary　mechanism　of　the　university　Internet　public　opinion　events.　Firstly,　we　discuss　the　interactions　and　behavior　of　three　key　participants:　an　Internet　medium,　university　students　as　a　whole,　and　administration.　Secondly,　we　construct　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　consisting　of　an　Internet　medium,　student　group,　and　university　administration　and　then　analyze　and　obtain　the　differential　dynamic　equations　and　equilibrium　points.　Subsequently,　the　evolutionary　stable　equilibrium　is　further　analyzed.　Finally,　we　employ　numerical　studies　to　examine　how　the　tripartite　behavior　choices　affect　evolutionary　paths　and　evolutionary　equilibrium　strategies.　Results　are　derived　as　follows:　under　certain　conditions,　there　exists　an　asymptotically　stable　equilibrium　point　for　the　tripartite　evolutionary　game.　On　the　one　hand,　appropriate　penalties　and　rewards　should　be　provided　to　foster　objectives　and　fair　behaviors　of　the　network　medium.　On　the　other　hand,　university　students　should　be　educated　and　guided　to　deal　rationally　with　negative　effects　of　Internet　public　opinion　events.　Moreover,　online　real-name　authentication　is　an　important　and　necessary　measure.　Finally,　the　university　administration　should　release　truthful,　timely,　and　comprehensive　information　of　Internet　public　opinion　events　to　mitigate　potential　negative　impacts.