Although　the　ability　to　manage　public　health　emergencies　in　China　has　improved　significantly,　there　are　still　many　challenges　to　the　existing　information　transmission　mechanism　in　pandemic　early　warning　systems.　In　this　context,　a　tripartite　evolutionary　game　model　composed　of　the　local　government,　the　whistleblower,　and　the　public　is　formulated.　By　using　Matlab,　the　dynamic　evolution　path　of　the　game　model　is　stimulated　under　different　conditions.　Stable　strategies　for　an　early　warning　system　for　public　health　emergencies　are　also　explored.　The　results　indicate　that　the　cost　of　whistleblowing,　the　cost　of　response,　and　the　beneyt　of　attention　signiycantly　influence　strategic　decisions　among　three　parties.　is　study　highlights　the　importance　of　whistleblowing　in　managing　public　health　emergencies.　Yet,　our　findings　provide　theoretical　support　for　policy　recommendations　for　promoting　public　health　emergency　preparedness.